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Contingent Fee: Champerty or Champion?
Arthur L. Kraut*
N 1952, AN ARTICLE APPEARED in Reader's Digest magazine castigating
both the contingent fee system of financing litigation and the trial
lawyers of the United States.' Since that article appeared, the client
public has been barraged with a stream of propaganda aimed at
barring the use of the contingent fee as a means of retaining a
lawyer. 2
Basically, the contingent fee contract or arrangement consists
of an agreement between a lawyer and his client that the lawyer
will render his professional services, in order to obtain a judgment
or settlement for his client, and the client will pay, as a fee to his
lawyer, an amount equal to a certain percentage of the ultimate
recovery. The fee may be a flat percentage of any recovery, a series
of increasing or decreasing percentages depending upon the size
of the recovery, or a series of increasing percentages depending upon
the stage of the negotiation or litigation at which the recovery is
achieved. If the lawyer is successful in carrying his client's cause
to fruition, he is entitled to his fee as agreed upon. If the claim is
defeated and no recovery is had, the client pays the lawyer no
legal fee whatsoever.3
On its face, the contingent fee would appear to be quite a bar-
gain for the client and a considerable risk for the attorney. Despite
the risk involved-that the attorney may expend a considerable
amount of time and effort on a case and receive no compensation
in the event he is unable to achieve a judgment for his client-the
contingent fee is now the dominant means of financing litigation
in several important areas of legal practice in the United States,
such as: the collection of overdue commercial accounts, stockholder's
suits, class actions, tax practice, condemnation proceedings, will
contests, and, to the greatest extent, in personal injury litigation.4
The claims asserted by opponents of the contingent fee are that
the contingency of the fee adds a high degree of speculation to the
practice of law. This speculation gives rise to such practices, on the
part of attorneys, they say, as soliciting and "quickie" settlements,
the purpose of which is to achieve a higher rate of return through
increased quantity of clients and suits. As a consequence, it is asserted,
B. A., Fairleigh Dickinson University; Third-year student, Cleveland State University
College of Law.
I Velie, And Then-Sudden Ruin, Reader's Digest, Sept., 1952 at 79.
' See M. T. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968); Bus. W., Jan. 12, 1963, at
113; LAWYER REFORM NEWS, June-July, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
8 Report of the Committee on Personal Injury Claims: Sec. 15 Contingent Fees,' 40
CALIF. ST. B. J. 148, 189 (1965).
F. B. MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICF-s at 25 (1964).
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the quality of professional services suffers because the attorney
becomes a partner in the lawsuit rather than an impartial advocate
of his client's cause. The claim is made that the attorney, by reason
of the contingent fee contract, is changed from a knight in shining
armor, protecting his client's case, into an ambulance chaser and shyster,
protecting only his fee.5
While one element of the opposition seeks control of only un-
reasonable contingent fee agreements, other members of the anti-
contingent fee group consider the contingent fee to be malum in se,
and therefore, are lobbying the legislatures to obtain statutory pro-
hibition of the use of the contingent fee. This view that the contingent
fee is intrinsically evil and should be prohibited is the majority view
in the world at large. Outside the United States the contingent fee
is considered champertous and is prohibited by statute or common
law. Before the late 1800's, the common law prohibition of contingent
fees existed in a number of United States jurisdictions as well, but
today the validity of contingent fee contracts as a means of financing
legal services is firmly established in the majority of United States
jurisdictions including the federal jurisdictions. 6
Before considering whether the use of the contingent fee agree-
ment is another progressive movement within the United States
legal system or a corruption of the legal profession demanding
strict control or prohibition, the law and rules presently attached
to the contingent fee system in the majority of jurisdictions will be
presented, based on an examination of the contingent fee in the
state of Ohio, which is typical of the United States majority allowing
the use of the contingent fee.
Contingent Fees, Champerty, and the Courts
As early as 1823, it was established in Ohio that champertous
agreements would not be enforced by the Ohio courts despite the
lack of any statutes establishing champerty and maintenance as
criminal in Ohio, or declaring champertous contracts void or even
voidable. In the landmark case of Key v. Vattier,7 an attorney, Key,
and one Vattier signed an agreement whereby the attorney would
render his professional services to regain certain land and personalty
for Vattier. In return for these services, the attorney was to receive
as his sole compensation, a portion of the land recovered. Vattier,
on his part, also agreed not to settle the case without Key's consent.
5 Supra note 2; Panel Discuision: Contingent Fees, 18 FED. INS. COUNS. 0. 63 (1967) ;
Rhoads, Acquiring Interest in Litigation-The Role of the Contingent Fee, 54, Ky.
L. J. 155 at 157 (1965) ; M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS at 261 (1967).
6 For a detailed history and background of the contingent fee see MACKINNON, CON-
TINGENT FEES FOp LEGAL SERVICES Parts One and Two (1964); Radin, Contingent
Fees in California, 28 CALiF. L. REV. 587 (1940); Williston, The Contingent Fee in
Canada, 6 ALBERTA L. REV. 184 (1968).
1 Key v. Vattier, I Ohio 132 (1823).
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At this point, the contract entered into by Key and Vattier
should be compared to the definitions of Champerty and Maintenance
in the Restatement of Contracts, which defines maintenance to be
the maintaining, supporting or promoting of litigation of another
person, while champerty is the division of the proceeds of litigation
between the owner of the litigated claim and a party supporting or
enforcing the litigation.8 The Restatement reads further that "...,
a bargain to endeavor to enforce a claim in consideration of a prom-
ise of a share of the proceeds, or of any other fee contingent on
success, is illegal, if it is also part of the bargain that (a) the party
seeking to enforce the claim shall pay the expenses incident thereto,
or that (b) the owner of the claim shall not settle or discharge it."9
According to the terms of the contract between Vattier and his
attorney, Vattier need do nothing. Key would enforce the claim at
his own expense. This would bring the contract within the definition
of maintenance. By the terms of the contract, if Key were successful
in enforcing Vattier's claim, he would share 50/50 in the proceeds
of the litigation, which, as defined above, constitutes champerty.
The fact that a contingent fee arrangement was champerty and
maintenance would have made it illegal at common law,' 0 but a
contingent fee per se was not and is not today illegal in the United
States except in certain New England states,'2 and in all jurisdic-
tions, in particular, in proceedings such as criminal trials and divorce
proceedings. However, in Key and Vattier's contract, the agreement
included the lawyer's promise to save the client free from all costs
regardless of the outcome. Vattier also agreed not to settle without
his lawyer's consent. Such agreements are said to be bargains tending
to obstruct the administration of justice and are, therefore, deemed
unethical and invalid in the greater part of American jurisdictions.' 4
After successfully recovering the land and personalty for his
client, the attorney, Key, sought to collect his fee, 50% of the land
as agreed upon, but Vattier refused to convey or pay. Suit was
brought for specific performance of the contingent fee contract and
the question of the validity of the contract reached the Ohio Supreme
Court. Judge Burnet, in speaking for the court, stated that the agree-
ment did constitute champerty and maintenance at common law;
however, the common law in Ohio regarding crimes and misdemeanors
B RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 540 (1932).
9 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 542 (1932).
10 Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1935).
11 Supra note 4, at 39.
22 ME. REv. STAT. tit. 13 § 18 (1964); Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308, 151 A. 542
(1930) ; Sullivan v. Goulette, 182 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1962) ; McInerney v.
Massosoit Greyhound Assn.,-Mass.-, 269 N.E.2d 211 (1970).
28 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 542(2) (1932); see also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 & DR 2-106(c).
14 F. B. MACKiNNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES at 75 (1964); Peck v.
Heurich, 167 U.S. 624 (1897) ; Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571 (1923).
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was abrogated by codification and the prohibitions against champerty
and maintenance were left uncodified. He went on to say that since
there was no common law in Ohio due to the codification nor any
statute prohibiting acts of champerty and maintenance, it would
seem that the court would have no choice but to enforce the contract.
However, the court had a spare arrow in its quiver, namely, public
policy. The court looked to the reasons for the common law pro-
hibition against champerty and maintenance. Judge Burnet noted
that contingent fee contracts tended to make it easy to bring suit
and often fostered litigation rather than settlement, and were injur-
ious to the peace and happiness of the community. Champertous con-
tracts were used by the lords in England of old to harass the smaller
land owners. The court found that the reasons behind the public
policy prohibiting such contracts was as valid today as it was in
medieval times. The judge concluded by ruling that contracts which
would have constituted champerty at common law were still against
public policy.15
Since the contract for a contingent fee as devised by Key was
against public policy, why didn't the legislature codify that policy
into the law of the state? Judge Burnet suggested that the state
legislature's failure to enact statutes declaring champerty and main-
tenance to be illegal was a tacit reliance by the legislature on the
fact that champertous contracts were void at common law and the
ability of the courts to refuse to enforce champertous contracts on
the basis of public policy and punish acts of champerty committed
before the court as contempt was enough to control the contingent
fee contract in Ohio, making a criminal indictment to protect the
public unnecessary. Champertous contracts were deemed intrinsically
evil in that they contribute to the stirring up of lawsuits, which has
always been considered violative of public policy. The contingent
fee contract between Key and Vattier was declared to be champer-
tous and, therefore, against public policy and unenforceable in the
courts of Ohio regardless of the absence of statute or even any injury
shown, as no statute or actual injury is needed to avoid a contract
which is violative of public policy.16
:, The principles laid down in Key v. Vattier were restated 21 years
later in Weakly v. Hall17 where the court again admitting the lack of
any statute declared that champertous contracts were void and un-
enforceable, in or out of the legal profession. In a later case, Stewart
v. Welch,i8 the court held that a champertous clause in a contract
could not be severed from the whole and such contracts were void
in their entirety.
15 Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 (1823).
16 I/d.
17 Weakly v. Hall, 13 Ohio 167 (1844).
18 Stewart y. Welch, 41 Ohio St. 483 (1885).
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This stand of the Ohio courts against the enforcement of con-
tingent fee contracts, which had a taint of champerty and main-
tenance, weakened as the use of this type of fee arrangement in-
creased without the legislature taking any action against its abuses.
The Courts refused to act as super legislatures in this area. Case law
in Ohio contains only a handful of decisions declaring a contract
champertous during the 20th century.19 To the contrary, in cases
involving the issue of the validity of a contingent fee contract, it was
held that a client could assign an interest in a judgment in payment
to his attorney for services rendered in getting the judgment and for
any subsequent services necessary to ultimately collect it. The state-
ments in Key v. Vattie, Weakly v. Hall, and Stewart v. Welch that such
contracts gave the attorney an interest in the litigation that was
champertous at common law and against public policy and, therefore,
were void and unenforceable were held not to be a correct statement
of the law today. The reasons existing for the laws prohibiting
champerty and maintenance in England during medieval times were
declared non-existent today. 20
Even where the courts have declared a fee arrangement to be
unenforceable, by reason of champerty, the attorney has been allowed
to recover in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the legal
services he has rendered.21
The prior holding that the law will not tolerate a lien on a judg-
ment in or out of the legal profession has also been reversed as courts
of equity have allowed the attorney what is known as a special or
charging lien on the judgment, decree, or award obtained for his
client.2 2 Such liens are granted on the theory that the services of
the attorney created the fund.23 Where the client and attorney have
contracted that the latter shall receive a specified amount of the
recovery, such agreement has been held to operate as an equitable
lien in favor of the attorney. 24
In effect, the courts have allowed attorneys to freely engage in
common law champerty, the only penalty for getting caught being
the loss of that amount over the reasonable value of the lawyer's
services. The attorney cannot only engage in contracts with his client
which give him an interest in the judgment, decree, or award, but
the courts will allow such an interest to be obtained in any instance
where his professonal services in a lawsuit create a fund.2 5 It cannot
19 Dombey, Tyler, Richards and Grieser v. Detroit T. & 1. R. Co., 351 F.2d 121 (6th
Cir. 1965) & cases cited therein.
20 p. C., C. & St. L. v. Volkert, 58 Ohio St. 362, 50 N.E. 924 (1898) ; Reece v. Kyle, 49
Ohio St. 475, 37 N.E. 747 (1892).
21 Brown v. Bruner, 10 Ohio App 314 (1919); 100 ALR 2d 1378 (1965).
22 Ohio Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 137 (1968); Stevens, Our Inadequate Attorney's Lien
Statutes-A Suggestion, 131 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1956).
23 Cohen v. Goldberger, 109 Ohio St. 22, 141 N.E. 656 (1923).
24 Chapman v. Lee, 45 Ohio St. 356, 13 N.E. 736 (1887) ; 143 ALR 204 (1943).
25 Weakly v. Hall, 13 Ohio 167 (1844) ; Stewart v. Welch, 41 Ohio St. 483 (1885).
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be denied that the courts have now legalized practices which were
heretofore considered champertous and illegal not only in England
but in 19th century Ohio.2 6
There are still some contingent fee contracts which will still be
held void and unenforceable in Ohio. The contingent fee is void if
coupled with a clause calling for mutual consent of the lawyer and
the client to any settlement.27 Anything that interferes or would tend
to interfere with a settlement is frowned upon by courts with over-
crowded trial dockets. The attorneys point to the practices of certain
insurance companies, which use any trick possible to get the client
to settle against the client's interest. The fact that a clause prohibiting
unilateral settlement protects the attorney's fee is claimed to be only
incidental to the protection such a clause affords the client against
over-reaching by unscrupulous defendants. 28
The insurance companies are quick to point out the abuses which
an attorney could commit under such a mutual consent clause. The
attorney may think that carrying a case through trial may cut into
his fee too much and, therefore, settle, when his client's best interests
would be served by going to trial. On the other hand, the attorney
might choose to go to trial on a gamble to increase his fee, even
though the settlement offer is fair and more reasonable a choice
under the circumstances, considering the cost and time involved in
trials for the clients.2 9 Opponents of the contingent fee contract go
so far as to claim that, even without the mutual consent clause, the
contingent fee creates a conflict of interest between the attorney
and his client.9 0
As the law stands today, while a contract for a contingent fee is
ordinarily valid, it becomes champertous by the addition of the stip-
ulation that the client shall not compromise or settle his claim without
the consent of his attorney. The illegal clause taints the entire contract
and cannot be ignored while the other provisions are enforced. The
contract is voidable at the option of the client and its illegality will
constitute a defense in any action against third parties, such as the
insurance company, which settles with the client without the knowl-
edge or consent of the attorney.31 An attorney may protect himself
to a certain extent by providing in the fee agreement that he will
receive a certain amount whether the case is settled by the attorney
with consent of the client or by the client alone. Then the attorney
20 Sonenfield, Survey of Ohio Lau--1955: Attorneys at Law, Champerty and Mainten-
ance, 3 W. REs. L. R . 232 (1956).
27 Lo Guidice v. Harris, 98 Ohio App 230, 128 N.E.2d 84-2, 845 (1954); Dombey, Tyler,
Richards and Grieser v. Detroit T. & I. R. Co., 351 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1965).
28 H. Ross, SETTLED Our OF COURT at 81-86 (1970); F. B. MACKINXOK, CONTING!T
FEES FOR LEcAL SERViCES at 75 (1964.).
29 Panel Diseumsion: Contingent Fees, 18 FED. INS. CouNs. Q. 63, 72 (1967).
80 Williston, The Contingent Fee in Canada, 6 ALBERTA L. Rev. 194, 199 (1968); H.
Ross, SEtFLEO OuT oF CoURT, (1970) at 80.
81 Davy v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 78 Ohio St. 256, 85 N.E. 504 (1908).
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may have a lien against the fund which even insurance companies
cannot defeat by payment to the client.32
The liberal treatment of the contingent fee by the courts in the
majority of United States jurisdictions has, in effect, altered the
definition of common law champerty. The contingent fee in these
jurisdictions is no longer considered champertous per se. Only when
the contingent fee contract includes a restraint on settlement or is
unconscionable according to standard contract principles will the
courts declare the agreement champertous and void. If the attorney
agrees to bear the entire expense of litigating the suit, this would
constitute maintenance and will also void the contract. The only
vestige of the common law prohibition against champerty which still
exists is the distinction that the courts now make in allowing the
use of the contingent fee, that the fee be measured by the amount of
the recovery and not be a contract to pay over to the attorney a
share of the actual proceeds (e.g., stocks and bonids or land) re-
covered.3 3 This distinction is form without substance, as the client,
especially the indigent client will have to sell the property recovered
to pay the legal fee and in the case where cash is recovered, the legal
fee will usually be paid out of the cash received from the defendant.
3 4
For all practical purposes, common law champerty is no longer con-
sidered a restraint on legal fees by the courts.
Ethical Considerations
The position of the legal profession in the United States, on the
use of contingent fees to finance litigation, can best be gleaned by
examining the codes of ethics adopted for self-regulation of the bar.
Canon 10 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio on November
13, 1952, cautions the lawyer not to purchase any interest in the
subject-matter of the claim he is asserting for his client.35 Canon 42,
usually cited along with Canon 10 in cases dealing with champerty,
maintenance, and like activity, warns that a lawyer may not properly
agree to bear all the costs and expenses of litigation without an
agreement by the client to repay the monies advanced by the attor-
ney.3 6 If the attorney and his client enter into a contingent fee con-
tract it would seem that the attorney would be obtaining an interest
in the litigation in violation of the above Canons 10 and 42, but Canon
13 allows contingent fee agreements provided only that such con-
8 Bailey v. Toledo & 0. C. R. Co., 3 Ohio N.P.N.S. 366, 15 Ohio D.N.P. 745 (1905);
Pennsylvania Co. v. Thatcher, 78 Ohio St. 175, 85 N.E. 55 (1908) ; Roberts v. Mont-
gomery, 115 Ohio St. 502, 154 N.E. 740 (1926).
83 For an example of this distinction made by the courts see McInerney v. Massosoit
Greyhound Assn.,-Mass.-,269 N.E.2d 211 (1970).
34 d.
85 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 10.
88 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 42.
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tracts be reasonable.37 The average contingent fee charged is 33%.38
Whether this is reasonable can only be determined by a court of
law, where the client contests the fee.39
The last major disciplinary case involving violations of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, in the realm of champerty and main-
tenance, came before the Ohio Supreme Court in Mahoning County Bar
Association v. Ruffalo (1964).40 In that case, an action was brought to
disbar a lawyer for, among other things, advancing living expenses
to his client. The attorney pleaded that the client had agreed to
repay the "loan" advanced, as required by the Canons. The court
held that, though the client had agreed to repay the expenses
advanced, it was obvious that if the lawyer had to advance living
expenses, the only way the client could repay him was out of the
proceeds received by judgment or settlement. The court held, the
attorney had in fact purchased an interest in the subject-matter of
the litigation. He was bearing all of the cost of the suit, looking
solely to the judgment for compensation. Piercing the veil of the
"loan", the state court found that the attorney in this case had
violated the Canons and was guilty of champerty and maintenance
upon which the Canons are based. The attorney was disbarred by
the state courts, but the federal courts, viewing his actions as neces-
sary under the circumstances, as his client was indigent, did not
disbar him.41
In October, 1970, the state of Ohio adopted the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility as its new ethical code of conduct for the legal
profession-42 A violation of the disciplinary rules within the 9 canons
of the Code could subject the guilty lawyer to action by the bar
associations' grievance committees and subsequently, to discipline
by the state courts, including possible disbarment. 43
Disciplinary Rule 5-103 AvoiDING AcQuISITION OF INTEREST IN
LITIGATION restates Canons 10 and 42 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. 44 The type of expenses which may be properly advanced by
87 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 13 as adopted Aug. 27, 1908 was worded:
"Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under the supervision of the
court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges." As amended on
Aug 31, 1933, Canon 13 now reads: "A contract for a contingent fee, where sanc-
tioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."
38 F. B. MAcKiNNoN, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES at 116 (1964); Report of
the Committee on Personal Injury Claims: See. 15 Contingent Fees, 40, CALIF. B. J.
148, 189 (1965).
39 See Rommell, Reasonable Fee and Professional Discipline, 14, CLEV-MA. L. REv. 94
(1966).
40 Mahoning County Bar Assn. v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396 (1964).
41 Id.
42 Code of Professional Responsibility, 23 Ohio St. 2d 1 (1970).
43 0. SCHROEDER JR., LAWYER DISCIPLINE: Tuir OHIO STORY at 20 (1967).
44 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PRELIMINARY DRAFT at 71 n.5 & 6 (Jan.
15, 1969).
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the attorney and the situations in which they may be advanced are
set out with the provision that ". . . the client remains ultimately
liable for such expenses." 45 Therefore, if a lawyer advances funds for
his client's living expenses, looking to the recovery for repayment,
he would be subject to the same disciplinary action as was taken in
Mahoning County Bar Association v. Ruffalo.46
The.validity of the contingent fee itself is recognized by the Code.
In EC 2-16 lawyers are counseled to participate in ethical activities
designed to assure persons who are unable to pay all or a portion
of a reasonable fee the means to obtain necessary legal services. 47
The view of the courts and bar associations regarding contingent
fees specifically is stated in the following ethical considerations,'
which are worth quoting in their entirety:
EC 2-20 Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have
long been commonly accepted in the United States in pro-
ceedings to enforce claims. The historical bases of their ac-
ceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of cir-
cumstances, provide the only practical means by which one
having a claim against another can economically afford,
finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to
prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of the
claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid.
Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept employ-
ment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay
a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily improper for a
lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of
a case, to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case
with any client who, after being fully informed of all relevant
factors, desires that arrangement. Because of the human
relationships involved and the unique character of the pro-
ceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relations
cases are rarely justified. In administrative agency proceed-
ings contingent fee contracts should be goverenel by the same
considerations as in other civil cases. Public policy properly
condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases,
largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do
not produce a res with which to pay the fee.48
EC 5-7 The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exer-
cise of free judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client
during litigation generally makes it undesirable for the
lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of
his client or otherwise to become financially interested in
the outcome of the litigation. However, it is not improper
for a lawyer to protect his right to collect a fee for his
services by the assertion of legally permissible liens, even
though by doing so he may acquire an interest in the outcome
of litigation. Although a contingent fee arrangement gives
a lawyer a financial interest in the outcome of litigation,
45 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5.
46 Mahoning County Bar Ass'n. v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396 (1964).
47 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2.
48 Id.
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a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil cases be-
cause it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain
the services of a lawyer of his choice. But a lawyer, because
he is in a better position to evaluate a cause of action, should
enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those in-
stances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the
client.49
These ethical considerations leave it up to the attorney himself
to regulate his use of the contingent fee along the guidelines set
out in the Code. They are not as strong a rein on lawyer's misconduct
as the disciplinary rules.50
Though the Code allows the free use of the contingent fee con-
tract, DR 2-109 does provide that an attorney shall not enter into
an agreement with his client where it is obvious that the client seeks
to bring an action merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously
injuring any person.51 DR 2-110 makes it mandatory that the attor-
ney withdraw his services in such a case.52 The major foundation
for the prohibition of contingent fees at common law was that they
were used as a means of stirring up litigation for purposes of harass-
ment.6 If the provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics and
Code of Professional Responsibility were strictly enforced by the
courts and bar associations, the claim made against the contingent
fee, that it tends to make it easy to institute malicious and spurious
suits, would not carry as much weight as it presently does. However,
the bar associations and the courts have been quite lax in enforcing
the rules regarding fees in general and the contingent fee par-
ticularly. 54 Crowded court dockets is the reason given for the failure
of the courts in disciplining over-reaching lawyers. The bar associa-
tions' failure to adequately regulate attorneys fees and punish viola-
tions of the codes of ethics is based on fragmentation of the bar
associations and therefore the lack of real power to act.55
The minimum fee schedule of most bar associations provide for
contingent fees of 33-1/3% before trial and 40% after suit is filed.56
These fee schedules are only recommended minimum fees that should
be charged in order to maintain professional standards and provide
a reasonable return for lawyers in general. 57 The suggested fee is
49 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5.
50 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PREAMBLE.
51 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2.
52 Id.
53 Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 49 (1935).
4 Supra note 29, at 63, 74.
5 ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement, (June 1970) at 92-100; For a detailed
analysis of legal ethics in practice and self-regulation of the legal profession see J.
CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHCS: A SURVEY OF THE NEw YORK CITY BAR (1966).
5 E.g., THE MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CUYAHOGA COUNTY
BAR ASsN. (1970).
5 ABA OPINION 302 (1961).
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the least a lawyer should charge. 58 No upper limit is suggested for
legal fees.5 9 The bar associations have not shown an interest in sug-
gesting a maximum fee, on the theory that the fee is a matter between
attorney and client to be arrived at by contract, free of external
restraint other than traditional contract law.60
The bar associations have found no reason to further restrain,
let alone prohibit, the use of the contingent fee. The only complaints
that the bar associations receive from clients involve the amount of
the fee charged. Particularly the question arises as to whether the
contingent fee is to be taken out of the recovery before or after other
expenses and costs of the suit are deducted. The bar associations main-
tain that disputes over the reasonableness of the contingent fee and
how it should be deducted from the total recovery arise primarily
where there is no written agreement. It is further claimed, that, if
the contingent fee arrangement is reduced to a written contract and
is fully explained to the client, complaints by clients would be
reduced to a negligable number.61
It can safely be said that the courts, bar associations, and the
legal profession in general, in the majority of United States juris-
dictions, support the use of the contingent fee and do not restrain nor
prohibit its use as violative of public policy or professional ethics.
The contingent fee contract is treated like any other contract between
two or more parties. If it is reasonable, the contract will be upheld.
If the contract is unreasonable the attorney will be allowed only to
receive payment in quantum meruit, without an allowance for the
risk involved in contingent fee arrangements. The contingent fee per
se is no longer considered to give the attorney such an interest in
the subject-matter of the litigation as to constitute champerty and
be void.
Criticism and Commendation of Contingent Fees
With the preceding background of the state of the law regarding
the contingent fee, the claims asserted against the use of this fee
system may now be more particularly examined.
A traditional complaint made against the contingent fee is that
it encourages persons to commence suits which they might not other-
58 S pra note 56. Forward to Minimum Fee Schedule.
59 Id.
60 F. B. MAcKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 13, 22 (1964); Report of the
Committee on Personal Injury Claims: See. 15 Contingent Fees, 40 CALIF. ST. B. J. 148,
190 (1965) ; also see M. BLooM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS at 192 (1968) for the
view that lawyers, bar associations, and courts support the minimum fee schedules
because they discourage "shopping around" by clients-but they also are used tojustify unreasonably high fees.
61 Committee on Personal Injury Claims, The State Bar of Calif., The Case for Con-
tingent Fees, 6 LAW OFFICE ECON. & MANAGEMENT 189, 194 (1965-66).
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wise maintain. It tends to promote spurious claims. 62 In days of old,
law suits were considered evil and to be avoided.67 Today, if a person
has a valid claim, the popular view in the United States is that he
should have an opportunity to assert that claim regardless of his
financial situation.64 If the court dockets are bursting at the seams,
the solution lies in reforming the judicial system, not in denying a
litigant the use of the contingent fee as a means of financing his
worthy suit. If modern pretrial procedure and discovery methods now
provided in most court systems 65 are properly used, the spurious
suit may be eliminated without the prohibition of the contingent
fee.66
Another traditional criticism of the contingent fee system is that
it is against public policy that litigation should be promoted and
supported by those who have no concern in it.67 Such a view of public
policy is outdated. Again, litigation is no longer considered an evil.
It is now recognized that great progress may be made in freeing our
society from such evils as sweatshops, racial discrimination, and
destruction of our environment, through the use of our judicial
system.66 Litigation in these areas is initiated primarily by individuals
and groups too poor to pay a fixed fee. The contingent fee system has
allowed persons, who otherwise could not afford a lawsuit, to assert
their claims and have their day in court as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. 69 Even in England, where the contingent fee is
prohibited, the public policy that litigation should not be promoted
and supported by those not a party to the lawsuit, is no longer the
popular view. The government now subsidizes those unable to pay the
fixed legal fees. 70 The United States experience has been that less
government control of an individual's actions is preferable to the
big brother concept of government. 71 A government subsidized program
providing legal services for those unable to pay a fixed fee, "Judi-
care," as a substitute for the present contingent fee system is in-
compatible with the American ideal. Why should an indigent person
62 F. B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES at 5 (1964); Williston,
The Contingent Fee in Canada, 6 ALBERTA L. REV. 184 (1968); Radin, Contingent
Fees in California, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 587 (1940) ; M. BLoOM, THE TROUBLE WITH
LAWYERS (1968); M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS at 261 (1967); H. Ross, SETTLED OUT
OF COURT at 82 (1970).
62 F. B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES at 210 (1964-) ; Radin, Main-
tenance by Champerty, 24, CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1935).
64 B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS at 14-2-146 (1970).
62 FED. R. Civ. P.11
66 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2917. 43 (page 1970) provides for a fine of no more than
$500 for stirring up lawsuits. A more strict punishment and more frequent enforcement
of this statute could have a deterrent effect upon the anti-social practices popularly
attributed to the use of the contingent fee.
67 Supra note 62.
6s See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ; R. SMrrI, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919);
The Case for Contingent Fees, 6 LAW OFFICE EcON. & MANAGEMENT 189, 191 (1965-66).
69 U. S. CONsT., amend. XIV; generally and amend. VI in criminal prosecutions.
70 Supra note 29, at 63, 65, 74.
71 Supra note 64 at 71-81.
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with a valid personal injury claim be restricted to the use of govern-
ment legal services, where a bureaucrat decides whether the claim
is worthy enough to deserve assertion by a government picked lawyer,
when, under the contingent fee system, the indigent may obtain the
lawyer of his own choosing and get that personal attention that is
lacking in the services rendered by an overloaded government
bureau? 72 Will the government salaried attorney be more concerned
with his client's cause than the attorney working under a contingent
fee contract whose very fee depends upon the successful advocacy
of his client's claim?73 The great cost of government subsidy of
civil suits should also be borne in mind. The government is presently
hard pressed to provide funds for the existing Office of Economic
Opportunity legal services let alone to provide for expansion of these
legal services to fee generating cases5 4
A government or commercially sponsored insurance program 75
may help those that can afford to pay the premiums of legal insurance,
but what is to become of those who cannot afford to pay for such
insurance, if the contingent fee is prohibited?
Given the fact that today litigation of a valid claim is not con-
sidered an evil, but rather is considered a right which, in the long
run, benefits society as a whole, the traditional criticisms of the con-
tingent fee, asserting that promotion and support of litigation by
"outsiders" is against public policy, are no longer valid.
More recent criticism of the contingent fee is that it leads to
a deterioration of the ethical standards of the legal profession.
The lawyer, by reason of his fee being contingent, will stop at nothing
to assure a judgment for his client, even to the point of inflating
damages, suppressing evidence, or bribing witnesses. It is claimed
that the contingent fee tends to promote ambulance chasing.76 It is
probably impossible to make any sort of reliable statistical analysis
to determine if these claims are true. Assuming that these practices
are committed under contingent fee contracts, a greater effort by
the bar associations and the courts in the area of lawyer discipline
would be more desirable than prohibiting the use of the contingent
fee. Soliciting and other forms of malpractice mentioned above are
72 Panel Dixcusion: Contingent Fees, 18 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 63, 66 (1967); Williston,
The Contingent Fee in Canada, 6 ALBERTA L. REV. 184, 200-201 (1968); M. MAYER,
THE LAWYERS 272-302 (1967).
78 Id.
74 This writer worked for the OEO Legal Services in Jersey City, New Jersey in 1968
and remembers well the problems encountered in attempting to provide adequate
legal services, while no one knew whether the political powers that be would renew
the office's grant for the coming year.
75 See B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970); R. KETON,
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS: THE SEARCH FOR A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE (1969); R. KEETON
& J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH (1967).
76 M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, (1968); Rhoads, Acquiring Interest in Liti-
gation-The Role of the Contingent Fee, 54 KY. L. J. 155, 157 (1965); 1 LAWYER
REFORM NEWS, June-July 1971, at 1, Col. 1.
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not inherent in the contingent fee. They are practiced as well by.
lawyers working under fixed fee contracts and will not disappear
with the prohibition of the contingent. fee. -
The previously mentioned criticisms of the contingent fee were
those asserted by members of the legal profession, members of the
press, and the insurance industry.77 The client public has had6i 6i
one major complaint against the contingenit fee arrangement, that 'the
fee charged is unreasonably high38 When the client first seeks legal
services in litigating his claim, he usually prefers that the fee be
taken on a contingency basis. This is so even though the client could '
afford a fixed fee.79 The -eason for this is that ' the contingent fee:
arrangement tends to minimize the very heavy expenses the client,
may incur in the event that his action is unsuccessful.8 0 If thelawyer
is willing to gamble his fee on the strength of his client's cause, the
client is usually willing to affix his signature to a fee contract
whereby he has seemingly nothing to lose. It is not until the attorney
successfully executes the suit that the client complains of over-reach-
ing and the unreasonableness of the bargain. The client forgets the
gamble that the lawyer took and claims only that. the lawyer has
not spent enough time, labor, or overhead to deserve almost 50%
of the recovery.8 l What is a reasonable return on 'a contingent fee
contract will depend on the strength of the client's case which is. ard
to accurately judge at the time the contingent fee contract is entered
into.
However, it is admitted that over-reaching does.exist under con-
tingent fee contracts.8 2 In those cases where the fee is so. unreasQn-
able as to constitute an unconscionable bargain, .the. courts lhave
always retained the power to declare the contingent fee contract
unenforceable and discipline the over-reaching attorney if necessary.83
If the courts in a particular jurisdiction find that the contingent. fees
in their jurisdiction are consistently unreasonable, in that they are
unrelated to the work performed and the risks involved,, the courts
may follow the example of the First and Second Judicial Departments
of the New York Court of Appeals and establish maximum fees that
"7 Report of the Committee on Personal Injury Claims: Sec. 15 Contingent Fees, 40
CALIF. ST. B. J. 148, 191 (1965); R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH at
30 (1967).
T8 Supra note 61 at 189, 190. .
79 This fact is admitted by opponents of the contingent fee.
80 Williston, The Contingent Fee in Canada, 6 ALBERTA L. REV. 184-,. 200 _(1968).
81 M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS at 141 (1.968)- examines claims .tlhat to the
contrary there is no risk involved as 90% of all claims are settled; see also Schwartz
& Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970) where economic models are used to show the fixed fee
system to be more profitable for both the attorney and his client in the :long. run..
82 Richter, Laymen, La'wyers and Legal Fees, 27 ALA. LAWYER 203, 205 (1966)..
83 Romell, The Reasonable Fee and Professional Discipline, 14 CLEv,-MAR, .L,RE.f.9-,
100 (1965).
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will be enforced within the jurisdiction.8 4 Such action by the courts
preserves the contingent fee system, rcognizing the benefits derived
from it, while at the same time, effective control is provided over
those who would abuse the contingent fee system for personal gain.
In summary, the old saying, "The contingent fee is the poor man's
key to the courthouse door",8 5 being still true today, it would seem
that the liberal approach to legal fees presently followed in the major-
ity of United States jurisdictions is preferable to any system proposed
by opponents of the contingent fee. The claims asserted to justify the
prohibition of the contingent fee become no more than echoes of a
deservedly dead feudal system without substance in a country which
prides itself on the fact that theoretically its courts are open to all
without regard to class, race, or economic condition.
Though abuses of the system are evident in everyday experience,
no study yet conducted has shown that a prohibition of the use of
contingent fees would be a better cure than freeing the courts from
their overload and giving more power to bar association grievance
committees. By taking these steps the contingent fee may be so super-
vised that the abuses surrounding its use and other breaches of pro-
fessional responsibility to the public may be checked.
The claim is made by laymen and even some members of the bar,
that the courts, legislatures, and bar associations are made up of
lawyers supporting abuses of the contingent fee system.86 Only by
self-regulation according to the Canons of Professional Ethics and the
Code of Professional Responsibility and by active support of move-
ments to increase the effectiveness of regulation of lawyer discipline
by the courts and bar associations can this criticism of the contingent
fee and the trial bar be met and stilled. This action, coupled with more
publicity as to the benefits to be derived from the contingent fee
system of financing litigation, will assure the continuance of the con-
tingent fee for the benefit of both attorney and client.
84 For an examination of the N. Y. Court Rule see Romell, The Reasonable Fee and
Professional Discipline, 14 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REy. 94, 105 (1965); Panel Discussion:
Contingent Fees, 18 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 63, 75-86 (1967); F. B. MAcKINNoN, CON-
INCENT FEES FOR LECAL SERVICES 161-167 (1964); Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 1 0
N.E.2d 43 110 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1959) affirming the power of the court to adopt Rule 4
but also recognizing the importance of and necessity for retaining the contingent fee
system.
85 M. MCNAMARA, 2,000 FAMOUS LECAL QUOTATIONS at 215 (1967).
86 LAWYER REFORM NEWS, a new publication, is published by Lawyer Reform of the
U.S., a California based organization which allows attorneys to subscribe to its news-
paper, but refuses membership to attorneys on the grounds that they have a vested
interest in what the organization calls "the present corruption". I LAWYER REFORM
NEwS, June-July 1971, at 2.
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